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This dissertation is going to look at the law surrounding responsibility and accountability for 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS). The basic hypothesis for this work is that the laws 
are insufficient and the legal frameworks on a national and international level are not 
equipped to deal with the challenges posed by AWS. This dissertation will look at the legal 
and ethical challenges of these weapons systems, with the aim of posing some solutions to 
these challenges. 
 
Throughout history there has been a race to make technological advancements, some of 
which are merely trivial, such as a light that is activated by someone clapping or a device that 
will recite your daily itinerary by simply saying “good morning google”; however  more 
serious advancements can be seen in computer technology and life-saving medical 
equipment. At some point during the development of all this technology, it is likely that 
developers had to contemplate the legal and ethical implications of mass-producing these 
products for consumer use. However, what if we were to consider developments in 
technology that have lethal application, limited human control and the potential to be fully 
autonomous in the future?  
 
The development of such technology is currently a reality and is already being used in 
combat. Therefore, this dissertation aims to answer the question of whether or not the laws 
regarding responsibility and accountability of autonomous weapons systems are sufficient 
and what the legal and ethical implications of this technology are.  
 
The majority of the materials available surrounding Autonomous Weapons indicate that there 
is yet to be full autonomy attributed to robots, however contrary to this evidence one of the 
most distinctive fears surrounding this topic are the implications of such autotomy occurring 
and how this would affect humanity. Fear of the unknown is not an unusual human trait and 
the preservation of life is something that is a global value, because of this the concept of 
human dignity is seen to be one of the most important human rights, with the rules of war 
being implemented in order to reduce civilian casualties as well as unlawful action against 
soldiers in time of war. The new generation of autonomous weapons threatens such concepts 
and opens up a gateway into unknown territory where AWS technology is not solely 
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dependent on human operation. An interesting article was published in September 2019 
where an ex-google engineer disclosed how she resigned from Google last year in protest of 
being sent to work on a military drone project. Nolan stated that killer robots had the 
potential to do “calamitous things that they were not originally programmed for”.1 This 
article caught my attention for several reasons. First of all, it highlighted how fear for the 
unknown is shaping the way people view AWS, and secondly that so called ‘killer robots’ 
merely have the potential to do calamitous things, not that they are doing calamitous things. 
The latter point is crucial to unravelling the questions that I am posing for my dissertation as 
it indicates there are gaps in the understandings of both the technology itself and the 
legislations and definitions surrounding them. The subject of Autonomous Weapons is 
fascinating to myself and academics alike, particularly because whilst there is a willingness 
to develop such technology, there is a level of ignorance when it comes to the legality and 
ethics of such progresses. Whilst this is the case, it is encouraging to note that the issues 
identified have previously been discussed by academics such as Rebecca Crootof2 and Robert 
Sparrow3 as well as legal figures such as Christopher Heyns4. I found that these figures 
provided me with some stimulating perspectives on the subject that I hope to incorporate 
throughout my work.  
 
Throughout this dissertation the intention is for there to be an in-depth discussion regarding 
the law of AWS, including a conversation regarding the definitional development and the 
ambiguities surrounding this. Moreover, great consideration will be given to the 
responsibility and accountability of such technology as well as what ethical and legal 
implications have emerged and implications that could develop in the future. It is hoped that 
problems will be identified and discussed for each element of this dissertation and a 




1 Henry McDonald, 'Ex-Google Workers Fear 'Killer Robots' Could Cause Mass Atrocities' The 
Guardian (London 15 September 2019). 
2 Rebecca Crootof, ‘The Killer Roots are Here: Legal and Policy Implications’, [ 2015] Cardozo Law review 
3 Robot Sparrow, 'Killer Robots' (2007) Vol.24 Journal of applied science. 
4 Christof Heyns, ‘Autonomous weapons systems and human rights law’ presentation made at the informal 
expert meeting organized by the state parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons’ (13 – 16 
May 2014), Geneva, Switzerland. UN Doc A/HRC/26/36 
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The chosen methodology of my dissertation provides a framework that allows for the 
question at hand to be appropriately broken down into subsections, which combined allow 
the opportunity to answer the research question. 
The information that I will collect throughout my research will be desk-based research and be 
a combination of peer review journals, news sources and legislation. My initial starting point 
has been the website ‘Campaign to stop killer robots’; this provided me with an important 
insight to the main issues as well as providing me with an exhaustive list of reputable 
sources. This is particularly important due to the rising tensions surrounding AWS which 
inevitably means there will be contradictory opinions and articles that are perhaps not fully 
grounded in facts; because of this, the validity and the provenance of the sources will be 
imperative.  
This dissertation will by-in-large not incorporate the traditional doctrinal methods of 
research, instead we will look at the societal and cultural impact this technology has and the 
various writings around this. One of the main reasons for this is the fact that there isn’t that 
much ‘black letter’ law surrounding this area, which is perhaps, in some ways one of the 
problems. By integrating this research method into my dissertation, I hope it will allow for a 
discussion to be had regarding how the law of AWS or indeed the lack of laws for AWS has 
implications on society, therefore linking to the ethical consideration embedded within my 
research.  
 
In terms of the structure of my dissertation I have broken it down into 3 chapters, each of 
which provide a different outlook into why the laws surrounding AWS are failing to address 
the issues of responsibility and liability, and how such failings have created ethical and legal 
problems in the process. The first chapter is ‘Self-awareness of Autonomous weapons (the 
development of AWS) and is designed to provide some background on the topic and discuss 
some potential definitions of AWS. By having this as the first chapter I am able to 
immediately address the underlying issue that runs throughout my research, that being the 
definitional ambiguity involved in AWS. Whilst definitions seem to be a somewhat trivial 
area, my research led to me to believe that this ambiguity is at the core of this issue.  
Chapter Two is ‘Responsibility and Accountability of Autonomous Weapons Systems’; this 
will provide a large portion of the dissertation and will examine and compare the arguments 
for and against possible applications of responsibility and accountability. I hope to discuss a 
number of parties who are exposed to potential liability and the practicalities of doing so. The 
comparative nature of this chapter allows me to expand my research to international law in 
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order to identify possible ways in which legislation could be adapted in order to sufficiently 
address the accountability gap that is currently present.  
The final chapter will expand on the previous 2 chapters, discussing the legal and ethical 
implications of using AWS. There are some arguments that this technology creates a more 
precise and humane method of warfare, however, others suggest that actually it creates a 
human rights dilemma and that it should not be an acceptable method of combat.  This 
chapter will analyse these arguments and will expand on the concept of responsibility and 
accountability using a comparative approach.  
The structure of my research will allow for each chapter to complement each other and for 
the main research question to run throughout.  
 
Ethical Considerations:  
I have considered the ethical dimension of this project and due to the fact that it is desk-based 
research, myself and my supervisor feel there is no need for any additional ethical safeguards. 
However, this will be monitored throughout the life cycle of this project and if any potential 
ethical issues arise, they will be brought to the attention of the appropriate committee.  
 
Outcomes: 
The intended outcomes of this piece of research is to provide a discussion regarding the 
practicality of allocating responsibility and accountability for the actions of AWS and 
whether or not current law provides adequate provisions for this.  Following a review of the 
literature I hope that I will be able to identify an area that provides the potential to be adapted 
in order to amend any inconsistencies or failures in the law as it stands. As previously 
mentioned, chapter one discusses the definitional ambiguity of AWS, this is an element that I 
expect will run throughout my research due to these failings being embedded in every 
element. I hope to prove that by creating a universal definition of AWS it is possible to create 
a set of comprehensive laws that can govern this technology. Furthermore, I hope to identify 
how the inability to allocate responsibility or accountability for the actions of AWS will 
create ethical issues as well as legal issues relating to international humanitarian law and 









Chapter One: Self-Awareness of autonomous weapons (the development of AWS) 
 
Having outlined the initial areas of this enquiry, this chapter is going to address the first part 
of the research question and discuss the development of these weapons systems as well as 
considering the the definitional discussion surrounding this technology.  
Recent years have been host to increasingly rapid technological advancements that 
incorporate varying levels of autonomy into machinery and robots, such advancements are 
shaping the way in which the modern world functions5. Technology is being pushed out of 
the realms of the impossible and into one of the most crucial debates of this century. The 
human ability to create biotechnology and to manipulate DNA all provide examples that 
show the human capability of engineering technology and genetics in in order to enhance the 
human body, with the human brain being the epicentre of such human intelligence. However, 
there have been extreme advancements in departments that are developing technology that 
can manifest artificial intelligence (AI) and is able to be programmed to act in a certain way 
that is independent to human controllers; such technology challenges the idea that the human 
brain is the unsurpassed form of cognitive intelligence. 
The concept of the singularity hypothesis6 suggests that eventually there will be no reason for 
the ordinary human to be ‘in the loop’; the intelligence of the AI technology will have 
exceeded that of the normal functioning human brain and humans will no longer be able to 
keep up with the rate at which such technology makes decisions and reacts. When you apply 
this concept to the advancement of AWS, the possibility of humans no longer being in the 
loop becomes a much more frightening and potentially catastrophic prospect.   
A crucial discussion in relation to the research question is that of the differentiation between 
legal responsibility and moral responsibility; whilst these are individual concepts one could 
argue that as we often view some legal actions to be immoral as well as some laws to be 
unjust, the two concepts conflate and compliment each other. And whilst it is true that one 
 
5 The advancements referred to here can not only be seen in the rapid development in Automated vehicles and 
weapons, but Artificial intelligence had a vital impact on society, from medical innovations using AI to simple 
household gimmicks such as ‘Alexa’.  
6 Murray Shanahan, The Technological Singularity (The MIT Press 2015). 
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can have law without morality and morality without law7, the combination of the two can 
provide for a more well-rounded set of legislations.  If one is to consider the above in the 
context of the responsibility and accountability for AWS, it is clear that whilst laws and 
morals should be considered in conjunction with each other, due to the discrepancies in how 
others perceive morals, the legal arguments regarding AWS provide a better opportunity for a 
global agreement as to the responsibility and accountability of AWS.  
This research will provide an insight into the possibility of allocating legal responsibility and 
accountability for the actions of AWS, whilst delving into the legal and moral responsibilities 
of developing this technology. In the process of doing this, consideration must be given to 
what exactly is meant by a weapons system acting ‘autonomously’ and the extent of self-
awareness of AWS. The following chapter considers how defining Autonomy in weapons 
and what is considered by ‘self-awareness’ has an impact in the ability for responsibility and 
accountability to be allocated.  
 
1.1 Defining Autonomy in Weapons  
Accurate and comprehensive definitions are key when it comes to any product regardless of 
its function, as a definition provides certainty and the ability to accurately legislate such 
products if this is necessary. Before we consider the legal or ethical arguments surrounding 
the responsibility and accountability of AWS, it is important that we establish the definition 
parameters of this technology and identify any potential gaps in these definitions.  
The notion of armed conflict is one that is familiar worldwide, yet in past years the nature of 
armed conflict has adapted, taking on a more technological form. Modern day warfare is no 
longer solely dependent on human soldiers, in fact it now has a heavy reliance on Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) and the development of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). Yet whilst 
we are advancing this technology at rapid rates, integrating it into armed conflict with 
seemingly little thought to the legal and ethical consequences of doing so, the lexicography 
surrounding this technology is failing to adapt as quickly as the technology itself.  
‘Autonomous’ and ‘automation’ have been used with some degree of interchangeability, yet 
in reality they bear different meanings. The issue regarding definition is one that is extremely 
prevalent in the field of autonomous weapons, with scholars and policy makers alike failing 
 
7 ‘The Difference Between The Moral And The Legal’ (Reason and Meaning 2020) 





to agree on a definition of autonomy in weapons. One could argue that this is a trivial matter 
and the need for a precise definition is redundant, yet this is actually an integral factor. 
Without a working definition that all countries can implement, creating a worldwide 
consolidation as to which military weapons are deemed to be ‘autonomous’ is near 
impossible. The lack of legislation and definitional clarity regarding the use of AWS leaves 
the issue of responsibility and accountability unaddressed.  
Currently technologies are being used that possess a certain level of autonomy including 
tracking, identifying, deciding when to fire a weapon or to detonate a device, with 
approximately 30 countries deploying or developing defensive systems8 that can be placed 
somewhere on the spectrum of ‘autonomous’. However, this autonomy is only actively in use 
in circumstances where engagement time is too narrow for human response. Such technology 
has been in use for the best part of 70 years9 and has naturally developed from being a fairly 
basic use of autonomy in weapons to much more advanced and precise equipment, but this is 
not the technology that is currently in the spotlight. Indeed, the debates regarding AWS and 
the concerns surrounding its integration into modern warfare at this present time are merely 
hypothetical and are based on the predicted advancement of AWS technology, and what these 
systems are predicted to be capable of in the future. Crootof considered that “there is a nearly 
universal consensus, among both ban advocates and sceptics that autonomous weapons do 
not yet exist10”.  Moreover, there is a further concern that AWS, whilst they are yet to exist 
on a fully autonomous scale, will fail to comply with the principles of the Law of Armed 
conflict and will lack the ability of proportionality, distinction and military necessity, 
alongside the application of the Martens clause. Such fears were set out in ‘Loosing 
Humanity: The case Against Killer Robots’ published by Harvard Law Schools International 
Human Rights Clinic in 201211. So why is it the case that countless NGOs including 
Campaign Against Killer Robots are calling for a pre-emptive ban on this technology? This 
could be explained in the point made by Paul Scharre and Michael Horowitz: they consider 
that the rapid advances in information technology makes the development of more advanced 
autonomous weapons something that may come to fruition sooner rather than later12, and 
 
8 Wg Cdr (Dr) U C Jha (Rhetd), ‘Killer Robots, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Legal, Ethical and Moral 
Challenges’ (VIJ Books (India) Pty Ltd, 2016) 
9 ibid 
10 Rebecca Crootof, ‘The Killer Roots are Here: Legal and Policy Implications’, [2015] Cardozo Law review 
11 Human Rights Watch & INT’L Human rights clinic, Harvard Law School., ‘Loosing Humanity: The Case 
against Killer Robots’ 1-2, 5 (2012) 
12 Paul Scharre and Michael C. Horowitz, ‘An Introduction to Autonomy in Weapon Systems’, (2015) Centre for 
a New American Security 
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whilst there is extreme importance in the awareness of this issue, there is a trend of leaping to 
the conclusion that AWS should be legally banned without having a fully comprehensive 
understanding of what is meant by ‘autonomous weapons systems’ and what their 
development would mean.13 One could argue that the apparent failure to develop a globally 
recognised definition of AWS allows the notion of “autonomous robot” to be subject to 
imagery of science fiction characters and anthropogenic robots. This knowledge gap is 
contributing to what could be described as a fear-based understanding of the consequences of 
introducing a more advanced form of autonomous technology, especially if that comes in the 
form of weaponry. With there already being a varying level of autonomy in existing 
technology, the question would be whether or not one definition would be able to encapsulate 
the complexity of autonomy. As previously discussed, simple forms of autonomous weapons 
and technology have been in use for approximately 70 years, but even seemingly innocuous 
examples generate these kinds of concerns; for example, existent ‘self-driving’ vehicles have 
the capability to manoeuvre themselves around obstacles and produce countermeasures to 
assist in the completion of its tasks, but do so with little concern for human safety. This 
demonstrates that although development of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWs) has 
produced the legal and ethical minefield we now find ourselves in, the legal grey area is by 
no means restricted to LAWS. There is no doubt that clear terminology is vital when it comes 
to providing clarification and understanding, without this the word “autonomy” will remain 
an umbrella term for a host of complex and varying AWS. Moreover, resolving the current 
debate on definition should be seen as a priority - once this has been established, issues 
regarding ethics and legality will be able to be considered.  
 
The aforementioned definitional ambiguity has led to different ways of thinking about AWS. 
Whilst these definitions vary, a popular theory can be seen in the form of the ‘loop theory’, 
which is based on the amount of human input/supervision. The Human Rights Watch applies 
this theory within their definition regarding degree of control, and defines it as follows:   
Human-in-the-loop weapons: robots that can select targets and deliver force only under 
human command; Human-on-the-loop weapons: robots that can select targets and deliver 
force under the oversight of a human operator who can override the robots actions and 
 
13 Whilst many academics such as Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner, and Matthew Waxman (“adapting the 
Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapons Systems,” international law studies, Vol.90 (2014), p.406)., 
 have argued that limiting the specific situation where the weapons could be used would reduce the risk to 
civilians, the opposition argue that a narrowly constructed hypothetic case cannot legitimise the use of these 
weapons, prompting for a pre-emptive ban. 
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Human-out-of-the-loop weapons: robots that are capable of selecting targets and delivering 
force without any human input or interaction14.  
 
One could argue that this bears resemblance to many theories including that of John Boyd’s 
observe-orient-decide-act paradigm15. In this paradigm, Boyd recognises that a military pilot 
is required to make decisions at a quicker rate than their opponent, and that this decision-
making process can be condensed into his model of an observe-orient-decide-act paradigm 
(OODA). This concept is not to be considered as an entirely new concept; however, it does 
organise this way of thinking into a strategic system that essentially allows one to adapt to 
any given situation, thus coping with the uncertainties of war. When considering this 
paradigm in the context of AWS, the level of autonomy attributed to the AWS systems would 
in theory mean that they would be able to adapt to different strategic situations, however the 
autonomy of a robotic is vastly different to the autonomy of humans and so the approach to 
this paradigm would be significantly different. A human is able to apply the OODA paradigm 
to situations where ambiguity is clouding judgment and there is the need deliver a fast 
reaction. Whilst this is the case Boyd comments that our inability to properly make sense of 
our changing surroundings is a bigger hindrance and can potentially mean that rather than 
shifting their perspective of a situation, humans will simply try and address their situational 
ambiguity by creating solutions according to their personal experiences.  However, AWS are 
yet to be given the self-awareness that the human mind possesses and so do not have the 
same perspective on a situation that a human may have. Applying this paradigm to AWS 
could therefore introduce a technology that has a higher effectiveness and a drastically 
quicker response time to any human soldier or pilot.  
I am of the opinion that whilst the OODA paradigm doesn’t necessarily provide a definition 
for AWS, it provides us with a mode of thinking that could allow us to understand the 
implication of AWS being developed and introduced into modern day warfare. One might 
argue that without this deeper understanding and the lack of comparison between the ways 
human soldiers and AWS would make decisions in an ambiguous situation, it is not possible 
to produce a definition that would sufficiently engage with the capability of such technology.  
 
14 Human Rights Watch, ‘Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots’ (19 November 2012) New York: 
Human Rights Watch and the International Human Rights Clinic, 
 
15 William Marra and Sonia McNeil, “Understanding ‘The Loop’: Regulating the Next Generation of War 





One of the most widely recognised definitions of AWS is from the US Department of 
Defence (DOD) directive 3000.09 on AWS (2012), which defines an AWS as: “a weapon 
system that, once activated can select and engage targets without further intervention by a 
human operator16”. This definition distinguishes autonomous weapons from semi-
autonomous weapons by providing a further definition of the latter as being “a weapon 
system that, once activated, is intended to only engage individual targets or specific target 
groups that have been selected by a human operator17”. The same directive defines AWS as 
being able to “select and engage targets without further intervention18”. Be that as it may, this 
definition is not without its ambiguities, the main concern being that the directive’s attempt at 
distinguishing semi-autonomous weapons from autonomous weapons somewhat tarnishes the 
clear definition above. The main distinguishing element of autonomous and semi-
autonomous is the level of human responsibility involved in the selection of targets, and 
whilst the directive makes an effort to distinguish between the two, one could be of the same 
opinion of Crootof in thinking that this element remains vague and unclarified. These 
definitions provided by the DOD show a similar way of thinking to that of the Human Rights 
Watch ‘loop’ theory. Moreover, the DODs definition is not dissimilar to the directive set out 
by the British Ministry of Defence19 in which it is suggested that an autonomous system is 
capable of understanding a higher level intent and direction which will allow it to take the 
desired action in order to bring about the intended state. The MoD directive continues to state 
that ‘autonomous systems will, in effect, be self-aware and their response to inputs 
indistinguishable from, or even superior to, that of a manned aircraft. As such, they must be 
capable of achieving the same level of situational understanding as a human…20.’ The 
concept of AWS being ‘self-aware’ is widely regarded as one of the main concerns in the 
development of this technology, as removing humans from the loop creates a whole host of 
legal and moral conundrums that will be discussed further in the following chapters.  
The 2014 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) expert meeting on “Autonomous 
Weapons Systems” maintained that there was yet to be an agreed upon definition of AWS. 
 
16 U.S Dep’t of Defense Directive No.  3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, (Nov.21, 2012) , 
<http://www.dtic.mil /whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf.> 
17 Ibid  
18 ibid 
19 UK Ministry of Defence, Joint Directive Note 3/10, ‘Unmanned Aircraft systems: Terminology, definitions 




Following the 2014 ICRC meeting, Rebecca Crootof made an attempt to further address the 
ambiguity facing defining AWS21: her new definition took into account the law in relation to 
armed conflict rather than simply the practicality of having a working definition. Her 
definition stated the following: “an ‘Autonomous weapons system’ is a weapons system that, 
based on conclusions derived from gathered information and pre-programmed constraints, is 
capable of independently selecting and engaging targets.” The way in which this definition 
has been phrased appears to address the individual concerns regarding defining AWS and 
takes into account the vital distinction between automated and autonomous. as well as 
accounting for the machine’s ability to, in some sense, ‘improvise’ within the constraints of 
its programming.   
Whilst there is still an element of ambiguity, it is clear that the numerous definitions that have 
been created all share the common theme of AWS having the ability to independently select 
and attack a target without  human intervention; suggesting the aforementioned ‘loop’ 
principal could be seen as one of the most agreed upon definitions at present. When 
developing a globally recognised definition there should be a balance between the 
recognition of the different domestic laws that may affect its implementation and the need for 
clarification regarding what an autonomous weapons system is classified as. A pre-emptive 
ban on the use of AWS in armed conflict is, as considered above, based on hypothetical 
developments of this technology. Yet it is seemingly impossible and somewhat impractical to 
ban a system that is yet to be provided with a recognisable legal definition.  
 
 
1.2 Self Awareness in AWS 
In view of the above it is clear that defining AWS is at present, one of the predominant 
discussions amongst academics and authorities, yet one could argue that the real concern lies 
within the diminishing human control that AWS possess and the technology’s increasing self-
awareness. The extent to which humans control the decisions of AWS is diminishing so 
rapidly that it is not unreasonable to assume that at some point in the future AWS will 
possess what could be considered as complete self-awareness. This is a quality that Crootof 
explains provides a threat to one of the laws of armed conflicts most fundamental 
assumptions; that ultimately, a human being decides whether another human being lives or 
 
21 Rebecca Crootof, ‘The Killer Robots are Here: Legal and Policy Implications’, [2015] Cardozo Law Review, 
Vol 36, p.1854 
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dies22. This is a point that Asaro considers when stating that, “it is the delegation of the 
human decision-making responsibilities to the autonomous system designed to take human 
lives that is the central moral and legal issue23”. Whilst this is a point that potentially has 
closer links to the liability and accountability aspects in respect of decision making, the 
element of machine liability is what ties this to the attribution of self-awareness to AWS.  
One of the oldest questions in relation to the use of AWS is its capability to function like a 
human, make ‘human like’ decisions and to think and reflect on its actions in the way in 
which a human is capable of doing. By giving technology the ability to essentially make its 
own decisions, developers risk removing things such as the degree of empathy, common 
sense, and creativity exhibited by a human soldier on the battlefield. Moreover, if AWS 
achieve a level of self-awareness that a human may possess, we leave ourselves with a 
number of questions that touch on a somewhat philosophical approach yet will also provide a 
unique perspective for the legal responsibility that could be given to AWS. For example, if 
the level of self-awareness increases, would this therefore mean that it is capable of making 
moral judgements, and if so, could it be held responsible for its actions? Murray Shanahan 
discusses the idea of Brain-inspired AI, and what the consequences of this would mean for 
humans and AI alike. However, more relevant to AWS would be the AI that has been 
manufactured from scratch and has not been modelled with the intention of replicating the 
way in which the human brain functions and is more focused on ‘artificial general 
intelligence’. AWS are not designed to mimic the appearance and behaviour of humans, but 
to resemble and act as weapons, as the name suggests. Whilst this means AWS do not 
emulate a traditional form of consciousness, they would be capable of showing basic 
cognitive qualities such as awareness, purpose and integration - all qualities that are 
inevitably going to be a product of artificial general intelligence.  
As with most technologies, there are varying levels of capability and advancement, and this is 
certainly the case for autonomy and self-awareness of AWS. If we take the basic example of 
a landmine, it is an entirely independent device that is capable of performing the task it has 
been assigned without the need for further human intervention. It will be activated when 
someone walks over it or if a vehicle drives over it, yet this is the extent of its autonomy. It 
cannot discriminate between those who it has been placed there to kill or those who are 
innocent in this scenario. It simply knows two states, either exploding according to the 
 
22 Ibid, p. 1845 
23 Peter Asaro, ‘On Banning autonomous weapon systems: human rights, automation, and the dehumanization of 
lethal decision-making’, (International Review of the Red Cross, Summer 2012) Volume 94 Number 886  
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pressure applied, or not exploding. This device would not be placed in the same category as a 
targeting system, for example. A targeting system would be functioning on a much higher 
level of autonomy, as it is designed to distinguish between many states and possibilities in 
order to achieve its desired outcome24; it therefore demonstrates a level of autonomy that 
links to cognitive skills. From these simple examples a clear trend emerges: the greater the 
responsibility given to an AWS, the greater the degree of cognitive skill required, and thus 
the higher the level of autonomy.   By assigning a device a higher level of autonomy we are 
essentially reducing how much it depends on humans when performing its tasks. 
The theory behind autonomous vehicles can also be closely linked to that of autonomous 
weapons due to the similarity behind their operational functions. The prospect of autonomous 
vehicles on our roads does not seem as deadly as an autonomous drone designed for warfare, 
yet as alluded to earlier, the legal and moral questions remain the same. Moreover, the in the 
loop system can also be applied here: with vehicles becoming increasingly autonomous, the 
purpose of the driver changes from being in charge of operating the vehicle to essentially 
monitoring how the vehicles system is operating. Therefore, like the relationship between 
operators and autonomous weapons the ‘driver’ of an autonomous car is essentially removed 
of its purpose to drive; the driver has to be assumed as completely out of the loop25. Both 
autonomous weapons and vehicles must be able to act autonomously with a level of self-
awareness in order to deal with critical situations and assess what the appropriate actions and 
responses are for any situations it may come across. 
As stated by the authors of “self-awareness in Autonomous Automotive systems”, a general 
challenge for self-aware autonomous systems is the fact that they are operated in an 
environment that allows only limited predictability. In most cases not all the effects that 
impact the system can be fully anticipated26. Armed forces around the world already have 
some autonomous functions, such as navigation, communication and detection, and the level 
of autonomy these systems show ranges from remotely piloted to fully autonomous. Whilst 
these systems are highly advanced, there will still be a certain level of unpredictability that 
will only be noticed when the system faces a certain degree of uncertainty where it is 
challenged to adapt and apply the relevant countermeasure to combat any issues that arise. If 
we take the example of an autonomous missile device that is programmed to get to a certain 
 
24 Giulio Tononi, ‘Consciousness as integrated information: a provisional manifesto’, (2008) The Biological 
Bulletin, Vol. 215 No. 3  
25 Johannes Schlatow et al., "Self-awareness in Autonomous Automotive Systems." Design, Automation & Test 




location, it is impossible to predict all scenarios which could occur on its journey and so a 
certain level of self-awareness is vital to allow such systems to operate effectively.  
A final point to make in relation to the self-awareness of AWS is the notion of the bar being 
set too high in regard to what is deemed as autonomous. The legal view of fully autonomous 
weapons being merely hypothetical is not misplaced and is grounded in the confusion 
surrounding differentiating between ‘automated’, ‘autonomous’ and ‘semi-autonomous’ and 
the conflicting definitions of what classifies as an AWS. An example of this can be seen in 
the U.K MoDs definition of “autonomous systems” in which it states that “…as long as it can 
be shown that the system logically follows a set of rules or instructions and is not capable of 
human levels of situational understanding, then they should only be considered to be 
automated27”. One could argue that this definition fails to take into account that as it stands, 
AI is unlikely to reach the same level as a human in terms of understanding of its situation 
and its surroundings, this remains a skill unique to the cognitive ability of humans.  
 
Having considered the definitional ambiguity surrounding AWS, it seems as though this is 
one of the main contributing factors that has led to the laws in this area being insufficient. A 
clear lack of structure and understanding is preventing a universally recognised definition 
from being developed, in turn one could argue that this has the potential to contribute to an 
accountability gap where responsibility and accountability is concerned.  The following 
chapter is going to concentrate on the concepts of responsibility and accountability and how 


















Chapter 2: Responsibility and Accountability 
The discussion in the previous chapter regarding self-awareness of AWS posed interesting 
questions both legal and ethical. However, once we emerge from the conversation regarding 
definitional ambiguity, we are left with the development of weapons systems that can act 
without direct human intervention. Thus, providing the prospect of technology advancing to 
the level at which AWS could be fully autonomous and thus rendering human input surplus 
to requirement. We are then faced with yet another legal ambiguity which opens up a unique 
conversation regarding the challenges of attributing individual responsibility.  Put simply, 
who is responsible for the actions of AWS?  
By design, AWS and LAWS have a whole host of human agents who contribute to its 
functioning; this considered we are then presented with various individuals that could be 
candidates for legal responsibility of the actions of AWS28. It has been identified by UN 
Special Rapporteur Christof Heyns that those who could face individual responsibility 
include ‘the software programmers, those who build or sell hardware, military commanders, 
subordinates who deploy these systems and political leaders who authorize them’29. Whilst 
this is true, one must consider the practicalities as well as the legal boundaries involved in 
holding these parties responsible.  
The previous chapter touched on the issue of AWS becoming fully self-aware and capable of 
making its own decisions, however, this is not reality at present. Because of this, the 
attribution of responsibility to AWS itself will be difficult as it is incapable of acting in a 
manner that could be subject to criminal liability.  It is inevitable that the software running 
this technology will continue to be developed, increasing its complexity, therefore adding to 
the fact that not one person is involved in its creation or its functioning. It is thought that with 
the increase in people working on this software, it will reduce the likelihood that one 
individual will have complete understanding on how the software functions as a whole, it 
therefore follows that its functioning could be unpredictable as well30.  We must also then 
consider the prospect that in the future, near or distant, fully autonomous weapons systems 
 
28 Nehal Bhuta, Susanne Beck, Robin Geiß, Hin-Yan Liu and Clause Kreß, Autonomous Weapons Systems, Law, 
Ethics, Policy, (Cambridge University Press 2016), pages, 303-324. 
29 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Report of The Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions’ (United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council 2013) A/HRC/23/47 
30 James G Foy, ‘Autonomous Weapons Systems: Taking the Human out of International Humanitarian Law’, 
(2014) Vol.23, Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies p.58 
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may be reality, removing the human input element and creating a further concern regarding 
attributing responsibility to technology.  
Considering the above, in the situation where the conduct of AWS violates the laws of war or 
if a malfunctioning of the technology, faulty programming or misguided deployment results 
in international crimes being committed, who are we holding responsible for such violations? 
More importantly who should be held responsible?  
 
 2.1 Criminal Responsibility  
When considering the practical and legal standing of applying responsibility then a logical 
starting point would be to consider the elements of criminal responsibility both domestic and 
international. 
The basic principal of criminal responsibility is that when a person commits an offence that is 
deemed to be criminal in nature, they will be held criminally responsible for the commission 
of this crime. The perpetrator will then receive a penalty in the form of a fine, a community 
order or imprisonment. The presumption that someone can be held responsible for their 
actions can be rebutted in certain circumstances, for example if the perpetrator is a group, 
corporation or state, when the subject of the blame is an animal or non-human object, or 
where exemptions apply which mean that the individual responsible for committing the crime 
cannot be subject to blame; this can be in situations where the perpetrator is a minor or has 
diminished mental capacity.    
Current laws regarding responsibility and accountability have long been integrated into 
criminal and civil law both domestically and internationally. However, such laws vary 
depending on which country they belong to, with Germany having a more complex and 
versatile set of laws that recognise the concept of direct and indirect perpetrators.  German 
law recognises that a person who commits and act through another is an indirect 
perpetrator31, signifying that the indirect perpetrator (Hintermann) has control over the direct 
perpetrator (Vordermann). The Hintermann often exploits a certain deficit that the 
Vordermann possess, this can be something as simple as lacking the intent for the offence. 
The German concept of someone being held criminal responsible by acting through another 
person is also acknowledged on an international level, with Article 25(3) (a) of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court providing ‘whether as an individual, jointly with 
 
31 German Criminal Code, in the version promulgated on 13 November 1998, federal Law Gazette 
[bundersgesetxblatt] I, p. 3322, last amended  by article 1  of the law of the 24 September 2013, federal Law 
gazette I, p. 3671 and with the text of Article 6(18) of the Law of 10 October 2013, federal gazette I, p. 3799 
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another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally 
responsible32’. In view of this, an analogous comparison can be made between AWS and the 
Vordermann; whilst AWS are programmed to adapt and to make decisions based on the 
algorithms it has been assigned, at present it lacks the human ability to intend to commit an 
offence. Moreover, with intent comes the element of Mens Rea, an element which is designed 
to establish whether there was intent surrounding an action. Article 30 of the Rome Statute 
states that in order to act with intent, the perpetrator must mean to engage in the conduct and 
mean to cause or be aware that the consequences will occur in the ordinary course of 
events33. AWS have been developed to operate in hostile environments and the functioning 
of the AWS itself is inherently unpredictable, this considered it is unlikely that one would be 
able to argue that is actions fit the requirements of the Mens Rea. Whilst there are inherent 
difficulties in applying laws that have been designed for human application only to AWS, the 
general principals embedded within them provide potential foundations to re-design the laws 
in the context of AWS.  
We are all aware that the development of AWS was facilitated in order to provide strategical 
advantages in armed conflict; with this in mind it seems only natural that they could be used 
to commit crimes capable of being recognised as war crimes. With this comes further 
questions regarding not only the legal implication of responsibility and accountability but 
also the ethical whirlwind surrounding AWS being in charge of kill decisions. This is an area 
that will be discussed in detail in a later chapter. Given that this is a very real prospect, 
attention should be given to Criminal responsibility being applied on the international stage 
in relation to international crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
Individual criminal responsibility for war crimes committed in International Armed Conflicts 
has been the basis for prosecutions under the Charters of the International Military Tribunal 
of Nuremberg and at Tokyo, under the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia and the statute of the International Criminal Court34. There have been 
countless examples of war criminals having been tried on the basis of this principle. Of some 
significance is the case of Tadić in 1995 which was seen in the Appeals Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; the conclusion in this case was 
that there was in fact individual criminal responsibility for war crimes committed in non-
 
32 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF. 183/9, I July 2002 
33 Article 30 of the Rome Statute 
34 IMT Charter (Nuremberg), Article 6; IMT Charter (Tokyo), Article 5; ICTY Statute, Articles 2–3); ICC 
Statute, Articles 5 and 25. 
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international armed conflicts35. One could argue that the significant developments in the 
1990s of individual criminal responsibility in non-international armed conflict was somewhat 
of a turning point in IHL (international humanitarian law), allowing those who had been at 
the forefront of such internal atrocities to be held responsible for their actions.  Amongst 
these developments, the case of Tadić now provides us with a precedent for individual 
criminal responsibility for war crimes being committed in non-international armed conflicts. 
However, as with the majority of the laws governing armed conflict (international or non-
international), the issues arise when it comes to determining responsibility for war crimes 
committed by the likes of AWS and LAWS. Based on the fact that individuals who commit 
war crimes are individually responsible for them under IHL and ICL, one could argue that 
those who deploy an autonomous weapon system which has been programmed to carry out 
acts that amount to crimes under either domestic or international law should therefore be 
criminally liable. This is an issue that will be discussed later on as whilst the solution seems 
somewhat simple, prosecuting such individuals would prove extremely difficult due to the 
necessary levels of understanding and proving that the intention for the crime in question to 
be committed was present.  
Elements of the ICTY decision can be seen to have been adopted from The Elements of 
Crimes document which considered the substantive crime within the Rome Statute. Within 
this, it stated that for every war crime there was a requirement that the alleged conduct “took 
place in the context of and was associated with an [international or non-international 
depending upon the precise provision of the statute] armed conflict36’.  
 Moreover, it is also the case that criminal responsibility in the context of a war crime has 
also been applied to individuals who have attempted to commit war crimes, as well as for 
those individuals who have assisted in, facilitated or aided or abetted the commission of a 
war crime. One could argue that this bares close resemblance to the approach seen in German 
law. 
One could consider this by approaching AWS as being akin to a Vordermann, who possesses 
some defect or deficit, such as the lack of capacity to act intentionally. The fact that AWS 
lacks the human qualities it takes to carry out an intentional act separate to its programming 
makes it an innocent agent as its actions can be controlled or caused by a human agent.   It is 
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no mystery that AWS and LAWS have been developed in order to be integrated into warfare 
to reduce human involvement and in theory soldier casualties and fatalities. Naturally this 
comes with the benefit that such technology has a precision that cannot be obtained by a 
human and so a more accurate form of warfare can be engaged. Considering the above it is 
possible to argue that these elements could be adapted and applied in order to allocate 
responsibility and accountability, be it criminal or civil, to those involved in the commission 
and actions of AWS. 
 
 
 2.2 Developer/Manufacturers’ Liability 
The concept of criminal responsibility is evidently well established within both domestic and 
international policy; however, the dynamic is bound to shift when this concept is required to 
be applied to AWS. As stated previously, Christof Heyns identified that there are a number of 
parties who are exposed to potential liability, this includes the developer/manufacturer of this 
technology.  
AWS have been developed to be able to operate with a capacity to manage their own 
operation, with various components working together to amplify its effectiveness. AWS 
technology was developed to provide specific advances, by creating algorithms that allow 
AWS to manage the operation of itself without explicit human operator input, moreover the 
speed and accuracy of modern computation means that AWS are able to function more 
efficiently in situations where a human operator lacks the capability of making such rapid fire 
decisions, especially in the heat of battle.37 The developers are programming AWS to be able 
to process information at a greater rate than a human would ever be capable and in turn 
creating what could be considered as more efficient warfare.  This demonstrates the 
operational advantages driving the development in this area.  
The process is undoubtedly complex, and it would not be possible for those involved to 
accurately estimate the possible consequences of their deployment,38 therefore making it 
extremely difficult to attribute responsibility to the manufacturer and developer. One could 
argue that if you were to hold the developer accountable for each death or war crime 
committed using one of the AWS weapons they helped to develop, then you could also hold 
 
37 Tim McFarland and Tim McCormack, ‘Mind the Gap: Can developers of autonomous weapons systems be 
liable for war crimes?’, (2014) International Law studies, U.S Naval War college. volume 90 
38 Geiss Robin, ‘The international-law Dimension of Autonomous Weapons Systems’, (October 2015), 
International Policy Analysis, Germany, p.209. 
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the developer of every gun, grenade, explosive and generic weapon accountable for the 
deaths, injuries and crimes their development has contributed to. However, it is worth noting 
that the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA)39 is implemented in US laws 
and was created in order to protect firearms manufacturers and also the dealers of these 
products from being held liable if crimes are committed using the products they have 
produced or sold.40 Whilst this is the case, the above parties will not escape liability if 
damage is caused by defective products, breach of contract or criminal misconduct. Similarly, 
they may also have liability for negligent entrustment,41 which involves them having reason 
to believe the gun is intended to be used for criminal purposes. From the implementation of 
the PLCAA we can see that it is in fact a legal possibility to exempt manufacturers from 
being held accountable for the use of their technology, could it therefore be said that a similar 
set of laws should be created that have the same effect to manufactures of AWS? 
Furthermore, if this became a reality and we used the PLCAA as a precedent,  and 
manufactures sold AWS to various Armed Forces or leaders of countries involved in non-
international armed conflict and were fully aware that they could be used to engage in War 
Crimes or strikes on civilians, would they be liable for negligent entrustment? 
The difficulty and impracticability in holding manufacturers responsible for the actions of 
AWS is  discussed by Sparrow, who considers that if you were to hold programmers or 
manufacturer’s responsible for the actions of their creation once it becomes autonomous, it 
“would be analogous to holding parents responsible for the actions of their children once they 
have left their care”.42 
A Human Rights Watch report stated that it would not be possible to hold the manufacturer 
liable for any harm caused, if: (i) the specification for LAWS was approved by the 
government, (ii) the weapons conformed to those specifications, and (iii) the manufacturer 
did not deliberately fail to inform the government of any expected or known danger from the 
weapon system.43 
 
39 “S.397 – 109th Congress: The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act”, 2005 
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to, and does, use the product in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical injury to the person or others”, 
a plaintiffs claim of negligent entrustment will be asserted under state law.  
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If we are to search for individuals to direct responsibility and accountability to, then one 
should consider that there would be overwhelming challenges in applying this to the 
developer. There is such uncertainty surrounding this field that to predict future 
developments and the way that the technology will be used would be ill-advised and 
challenging. Further to this, without knowing the outcome of future developments the task of 
saying how activities of the developers may constitute acts proscribed by the law of armed 
conflict is also extremely difficult.44 
 
 2.3 State Liability  
The development and deployment of AWS undoubtedly provides a new level of precision 
when it comes to armed conflict, the technology that is being developed allows AWS to react 
at greater speeds than any human soldier, providing strategic advantages and potentially 
reducing the mortality rate of human soldiers. However, this all comes at a cost; despite 
numerous states having commissioned the development and use of AWS technology there 
has been seemingly little consideration to the legal and ethical issues that come with them. As 
with any weapon commissioned by the state, there should be an obligation to ensure that the 
weapons are not being used in a way that violates International Humanitarian Laws or the 
human rights of those that come into contact with it.  
However, the conversation regarding state responsibility and risk management for when 
things go wrong is highly controversial. Robert Geiss considered that whilst the deployment 
of AWS is not unlawful when used responsibly, it is a high-risk activity that is not fully 
understood and so there is a level of predictable unpredictability.45 Considering this, Geiss 
states that a State that benefits from the strategic gains associated with AWS should be held 
responsible whenever such unpredictable risks are realised.46 It is clear from this that state 
liability is something that is being taken seriously and developments are being made in this 
area. One could argue that the State should hold a high level of responsibility for issues 
brought about by AWS as in theory, they are the party that is making the decision to integrate 
them into their own militaries and deploy them into combat.  
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If States are capable of being held responsible for the actions of AWS in the event an 
unpredictable risk occurs, then it would make sense to implement preventative measures that 
would reduce the harm that such occurrences could cause. An essential component of this is 
for States to acknowledge their due diligence obligations that are aimed at risk prevention 
and harm reduction – state responsibility arises in the event that such obligations are violated. 
The Law of Armed Conflict clearly provides for the way in which states should conduct 
themselves in conflict and the repercussions of breaching such conduct, building on the 
element of ‘due diligence’. Furthermore, Article 1 of the Geneva Convention I-IV requires 
States to ‘ensure respect’ for the laws of armed in conflict in all circumstances.47 There is 
therefore no reason that it would be misplaced in interpreting this to include armed conflict 
that involves the use of AWS. This being said there are still elements of ambiguity that call 
for clarification in order to diminish the opportunity of any State claiming that their actions 
do not amount to a violation of the Law of Armed Conflict.  Geiss considers that the problem 
is not that there is a lack of legal basis per se, but that there is a lack of clarity surrounding 
the meaning of ‘due diligence to ensure respect’ in the context of autonomous weapons 
systems.48 If we examine this, it is apparent that the issue here stems from the fact that this 
legal basis has been created in order to address human error not that of AWS, and that due 
diligence requires there to be a given circumstance, such as combat, and what a reasonable 
party would do if placed in these circumstances. The problem therefore arises when this is 
applied to the conduct of AWS, it is difficult to know what could and should be considered as 
reasonable when the technology in use is new and there are no precedents set to use as a point 
of reference when making this decision.  
An interesting point that Geiss raises is that whilst human beings are in charge of the 
deployment of AWS, accountability can be determined using the pre-established rules of 
attribution.49 This essentially means that if a member of the military of any given state 
decides to deploy AWS in the course of combat then the activities the AWS carries out will 
be attributable to that State and not the AWS itself – a weapons system possessing some 
autonomous capabilities does not alter this. It can be said that this accurately deals with the 
fact that whilst AWS exist, they are not fully autonomous (as previously discussed) and 
therefore humans still remain in the loop to a certain extent.  
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A further obstacle to state liability is that of jurisdiction; only states are able to submit 
contentious cases for ICJ adjudication, because of this, the Courts lack jurisdiction to deal 
with any applications from individuals, non-governmental organisations, corporations or 
private parties.50 Simply being a member of the U.N does not mean that automatically gives 
the Court jurisdiction, it would in fact require both states to have given consent to the Courts 
Authority.51 If we consider the consequences of a state submitting itself to the court’s 
jurisdiction, it is evident that there is little to no incentive for them to do so as simply 
admitting liability would increase the risk of significant adjudication costs, costs that would 
increase substantially if the State in question was found guilty.  
 
 2.4 Command responsibility  
Command responsibility, also known as indirect responsibility, is another branch of 
International Criminal Law that presents the possibility of holding a military commander or a 
civilian superior liable (criminally). It could potentially occur if a superior is found to have 
failed to take reasonable measures when preventing or punishing a subordinate if they have 
committed a criminal act.52 This is due to the fact that the superior effectively has control 
over the actions of the subordination, and therefore as soon as they are aware that one of their 
subordinates has committed a criminal act, they have a duty to act on this. This was discussed 
in the case of Prosecutor v Halilović,53 which stated that command responsibility will hold 
the superior accountable for dereliction of duty. Superior or command responsibility is a 
concept that has been historically been applied to a number of cases following the Second 
World War.54 Article 28 of the Rome Statute provides a provision for the ‘Responsibility of 
Commander and Other Superiors’. The acts states that: ‘a military commander or person 
effectively acting as a military commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the court committed by forces under his or her effective command and 
control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure 
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54 Wg Cdr (Dr) U C Jha (Retd), ‘Killer Robots: Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Legal, Ethical and Moral 
Challenges’(VIJ Books (India) Pty Ltd, 2016), Page 80 
27 
 
to exercise control properly over such forces…..’55 The accountability discussed here is 
activated if the superior should have known that the forces were committing or about to 
commit such crimes or that he had failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent or repress their commission. An important element to note if you were to pursue this 
level of responsibility would be the fact that it must be proven that there was a 
commander/superior and subordinate relationship between the parties. If this is unable to be 
shown, then the necessary elements would not have been satisfied and criminal responsibility 
of the superior would be unsuccessful.    
On one hand, this could be seen as analogous of AWS due to the nature of them being 
weapons and so functioning in a similar context to soldiers (subordinates) – this considered it 
could be said that there are potential grounds to trigger the doctrine or superior responsibility. 
However, AWS, if fully autonomous, have a certain ability to make their own independent 
decisions and judgments relating to target selection and engaging with a threat, with 
advanced technology embedded in them specifically designed in order for them to operate 
independently from a superior. If they are not under the direct command of a superior it 
would be unreasonable for one to expect superiors to have anywhere near the appropriate 
level of knowledge to trigger the doctrine of command/superior responsibility.  It could also 
be argued that the rapid rate at which AWS technology makes its decisions would make it 
near impossible for superiors to foresee that the forces were about to commit such a crime 
that could then make them subject to command liability. 
If we were to consider that the robot was able to communicate its decision to the commander 
prior to acting, then this would in theory mean the commander would have sufficient 
knowledge of the impending criminal act and it could therefore could be held responsible. Be 
that as it may, this would only be in the case of a ‘human-in-the-loop’ system, if however, the 
system was fully autonomous, there would be a dramatic reduction in communication with a 
superior and the decisions would be made without the need of approval. Moreover, it has 
been established that a commander must have sufficiently alarming information in order to 
investigate,56 without receiving such information they cannot be held liable for negligently 
failing to find out information. Furthermore, in Prosecutor v Strugar, it was noted that 
knowledge of past offenses by a particular subordinate may constitute as ‘sufficiently 
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alarming’ information, therefore the superior would have sufficient knowledge that the 
subordinate in question could commit future criminal acts,57 thus the mens rea of command 
responsibility would be satisfied.  
 
Taking this into account, we are then left with the confusion surrounding what the threshold 
is for ‘past unlawful acts’ that have been committed by AWS. AWS technology has been 
developed primarily as an aid to combat and due to its adaptability, there are different 
scenarios that this technology can be placed in and different tasks that it can be assigned. If 
we therefore consider a situation where one AWS robot engages in conduct that violates 
international laws are we to assume that this conduct is setting a precedent for a past unlawful 
act that can be applied to all robots of that variety and with that same programming or is this 
only going to be applicable to that individual robot? We could then contemplate a scenario 
where one specific algorithm has been programmed into a model of AWS robots that means 
they are to target combatants - however one of them mistakes a civilian as a combatant, 
strikes and kills the civilians.  This scenario has the capability of becoming reality, so in the 
event that this does in fact happen, are we to consider its inaccurate judgment of 
proportionality to be unique to that individual robot, or should the entire model have this on 
their record as a ‘past unlawful act’, given the unpredictability of it has already been 
demonstrated by one robot. Moreover, as previously discussed, the AWS technology is 
rapidly advancing and is complex in nature, in theory, in order for a commander to be able 
recognise that an AWS robot is going to commit a criminal act imminently, then they would 
have to have a some-what in depth understanding on the way the technology works, the 
nature of its programming and the level of autonomy it presents.  It could be argued that this 
is highly unrealistic as well as unreasonable, there for it seems likely that commander 
responsibly could be avoided.  
The issue of fast development and decision making in AWS also links to the concept that 
there must be effective control over a subordinate in order for commander responsibility to be 
applicable. According to the judgement in Prosecutor v Delalicet al,58 effective control comes 
specifically from the “material ability to prevent or punish criminal conduct”; punishment of 
AWS is not only pointless but also fairly impossible and the preventative aspect of this has 
already been identified as difficult due to all the varying qualities of AWS. Further to this, the 
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unpredictability of AWS means that there are any number of circumstances that cannot be 
foreseen, or alternatively, can be foreseen but nothing can be done about it, this all 
contributes to the application of effective control being questionable. Examples of the 
unpredictability mentioned could be signal interference, errors in its programming and the 
fast processing speed of AWS. If one of these situations occurred then the ability for a 
commander to intervene and call off the attack is diminished, demonstrating that effective 
control is not in place.  
 
One could therefore reach the conclusion that the application of command responsibility 
would be confronted with numerous issues revolving around insufficient knowledge and lack 
of effective control and consequently command responsibility would be an unrealistic form 
of responsibility to pursue.  
 
2.5 The accountability gap  
 
In the discussion surrounding responsibility and accountability, whether we are looking at 
state, commander or even criminal responsibility, a common feature is the gap in 
accountability. This gap has emerged due to the fact that the laws surrounding legal 
responsibility are yet to be adapted to accommodate the advanced nature of AWS and the fact 
that they are not human entities and so do not possess the human qualities referred to in 
countless laws regarding responsibility and accountability. Whilst one could analogously 
apply laws to the functioning of AWS, the accuracy of the conclusions would be heavily 
scrutinised, and it is unlikely that it would stand in a court of law.  
If we are to consider that AWS are likely to become more advanced and will be deployed 
more regularly, the likelihood of an international law violation is somewhat inevitable – 
when this violation occurs those involved will search for someone to be held accountable. 
Accountability is one of the most essential elements in international law, it aims to deter and 
prevent violations, and so protecting potential victims of human rights abuses and war 
crimes.59 The rules of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights law are in place to 
protect people against violations to their rights, including the rights to life; yet the 
unpredictability of AWS technology means that they do not have the capability to comply 
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with these rules, leaving people vulnerable to immense violations of their human rights. If 
civilians are wrongly targeted by AWS, the accountability gap means that there would be 
disputes regarding who is legally responsible for these violations. An accountability gap is 
dangerous for several reasons; however, one could argue that the most important reason is 
that if there are no consequences for human operators or commanders in the circumstances 
where such violations occur, then there is no deterrent for other states regarding future 
criminal acts. Bonnie Docherty, senior arms division researcher at Humans Rights Watch 
suggested that “no accountability means no deterrence of future crimes, no retribution for 
victims, no social condemnation of the responsible party”.60  If this is the case and there is a 
failure to produce a deterrent, then the same violations will be repeated by the AWS as there 
has been no intervention with its programming that would direct it away from the decisions it 
was making. Moreover, the violations that are being referred to are those that are inflicted on 
civilians, the lack of actual meaningful human control possessed by the weapons would 
therefore make it near impossible to hold anyone criminally or civilly liable for such 
violations and unlawful acts.  
Academics and experts alike argue that the presence of an accountability gap gives weight to 
the argument that there should be a pre-emptive ban on AWS production and deployment 
until the law can accommodate all eventualities of AWS. Human Rights Watch has said that 
whilst military commanders could potentially be found liable if they intentionally deployed a 
fully autonomous weapon to commit a crime,  such justice would likely be eluded as the most 
likely situation is where there is a violation due to unforeseen actions of AWS that human 
intervention wasn’t able to stop.61 Whilst one could predict the potentially dramatic outcomes 
the accountability gap will create, the unknown still remains one of the biggest enemies, until 
predictions become reality and the violations have been committed, it is unlikely that a pro-
active effort to fill the void will be attempted. In the meantime, any incidents caused by AWS 
will continue to evade justice and be marked down as an accident or even a glitch,62 in doing 
so the accountability gap is being allowed to act as a scapegoat for potential violations and by 
continuing to acknowledge this we merely risk trivializing the serious harm that could be 
done.  
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Chapter 3: Legal and Ethical Implications  
 
So far, this dissertation has provided an insight into how the ambiguity and lack of clarity 
surrounding the definition of AWS has further contributed to the development of problems in 
this area. The previous chapter drew on the points made in chapter 1 and explored how the 
lack of a clear universal definition has contributed to insufficient laws surrounding 
responsibility and accountability as well as how elements of international law could be used 
to somewhat fill the void in this area. This chapter aims to consider the legal and ethical 
implications of AWS, contemplating the impacts of this technology on a global scale rather 
than limiting it to domestic implications. 
   
The integration of AWS into armed conflict inevitably provides a cross-over between the 
legal and ethical implications of AWS; however, the legal aspects involved in the deployment 
and development of this technology seem to be overshadowing the ethical implications that 
have and are likely to continue to increase as this technology advances. To say that legality is 
overshadowing ethics is not to say that the legality is insignificant, rather, that legality and 
ethics should be considered simultaneously in order for AWS to be assigned with appropriate 
regulations. As discussed in the previous chapter, the accountability gap provides the perfect 
opportunity for ethical implications to go somewhat under the radar. The unpredictability of 
AWS not only means that they lack the capability of adhering to the legality of International 
Humanitarian Laws (IHL), but their inability to simulate human qualities such as empathy 
and morality means that they are also incompatible with the ethical consideration embedded 
in IHL and Human Rights Laws.  
One could argue that ‘Human dignity’ is one of the most important formulas embedded in 
international politics – once introduced in Article 1 of the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human rights, the concept of human dignity became an umbrella term that 
was used to bridge the gaps in ideological gulfs.63 In turn, this provided a unified terminology 
allowing the concept of human dignity open to a certain level of interpretation that allows 
each member state to speak with one voice. Human dignity as a concept has become 
increasingly incorporated in international documents and treaties, underpinning the majority 
of IHL elements such as distinction and proportionality; because of this I believe that it is a 
principle that forms the foundations for the legal, political and ethical implications of AWS.  
 




3.1 International Humanitarian Laws 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), stems from international law that has been put in 
place in order to manage and monitor the use of violence in armed conflict; the two-fold aim 
of this is to save civilians from the consequences of armed conflict and to protect soldiers 
from unnecessary suffering. The rate at which this technology is now advancing therefore 
brings new challenges to the basic principles of IHL. Whilst there are internationally 
recognised agreements to ban or regulate a number of problematic weapons such as 
expanding bullets, poisonous gases, antipersonnel landmines, biological and chemical 
weapons, blinding lasers, incendiaries and cluster munitions,64 these principals were created 
at a time where the technology involved in LAWS and AWS had not been developed and so 
making provisions for them in IHL would have been a moot point. This has now led to a 
reality where such technology is advancing at such a rapid rate that it is now exceeding the 
parameters of IHL. 
 
3.2 Distinction 
A core element of IHL that is threatened by the advancements of AWS technology is the 
principle of Distinction. This principle is made up from two components: combatants must be 
able to distinguish (i) between civilians and enemy combatants,65 and (ii) between civilian 
and military objects.66 Moreover, this principal has been codified in Article 48 of the 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention: ‘in order to ensure respect for and 
protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at 
all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian 
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against 
military objectives.’67 
When we consider distinction in relation to AWS, the main problem is that in an area of 
conflict the people present are not restricted to soldiers, there are a whole host of people 
involved including civilian workers, medics and injured combatants. The concern lies with 
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the fact that AWS 68 and LAWS technology is unable to discriminate between combatants 
and non-combatants that may be present during conflict. Furthermore, when we consider that 
the ability to exercise the principal of distinction requires an individual to have their own set 
of moral and ethical guidelines in order to make decisions, we are once again confronted with 
the fact that AWS technology does not have the ability to simulate the relevant human 
qualities which could allow it to construct its own set of moral and ethical principles. Human 
soldiers are able to take positive steps in coming to their decision as to whether the subject 
they are engaging with is a combatant or a non-combatant, something that also requires a 
certain amount of common sense. Further to this, another important feature that relies on 
distinction is the ability to recognise when someone is surrendering; Sparrow successfully 
identifies this as an important shortcoming of AWS, discussing that because this technology 
does not have the capacity to recognize someone surrendering, there are ethical implications 
in relation to the deployment of such weapons systems.69 Being able to differentiate between 
someone surrendering legitimately and someone using their body language to deceive the 
opposition is an extremely subjective decision and involves having the capacity to interpret 
the actions and intentions of the other person – this is not a quality that AWS technology 
currently possesses.  
A further issue is presented in the form of definition ambiguity surrounding the legal 
definition contained in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and AP I, such ambiguities mean 
that elements are left open to a certain level of subjectivity. If we are unable to implement a 
clear definition that it follows that it would be virtually impossible to integrate the concept of 
discrimination into the programming of AWS. Moreover, in order for a robot to be able to 
discriminate, they must first have the ability of recognition. It wouldn’t necessarily be beyond 
the capability of designers to allow AWS to have the ability of recognising basic signals 
(such as surrendering), however, the difficulty of this is the fact that war is volatile and 
unpredictable and takes place in unpredictable terrain. If you consider all the environmental 
factors involved, then programming that allows AWS to have basic object recognition and 
classification skills are rendered useless.70 Whilst programming basic recognition/distinction 
software may not be entirely unrealistic, creating software that can be implanted in AWS 
programming that gives them the same sophisticated capacity of interpretation of human 
 
68 Robert Sparrow, ‘Twenty Seconds to Comply: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Recognition of 
Surrender’, international law studies, Vol. 9, 205, p.299 - 728 
69 ibid 
70 Krishnan Armin, ‘Killer robots: legality and ethicality of autonomous weapons, USA: Ashgate’ (2009), p.98 
34 
 
reactions is something that is extremely complex and unlikely to be reality in the near 
future.71 
One could argue that because of this factor, the ability for AWS to comply with IHL is 
unrealistic and its lack of ability to distinguish between combatant and non-combatants is the 
reason that could be deemed unsuitable for integration into armed conflict.  
 
 
3.3 Proportionality  
The prospect of civilian causalities is inevitable in armed conflict and there is no way in 
which this can be eliminated from war altogether despite the best efforts of IHL 
implementing concepts such as proportionality in an effort to protect the civilian population 
in war zones. The rule of proportionality is defined in Article 51 (5) (b) of Additional 
Protocol I. It states that a violation of proportionality will be “an attack which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian object, 
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated”.72 It is clear from this definition that the principal of 
proportionality seeks to mandate that where there is collateral damage to civilian population, 
it must be proportional to military advantage.  
The concept of proportionality is applied in a military context when considering if the 
damage to civilian objects, civilian death or injury is anticipated prior to targeting a military 
object, an assessment is given in which the anticipated military advantage is weighed against 
the anticipated ‘collateral’ damage to protected civilians or civilian objects.73 In comparison 
to distinction, proportionality provides us with a more realistic opportunity to create 
programming that would enable AWS to make basic decisions that would present a certain 
level of compliance to the rules of proportionality; however, this would be very limited. Even 
if we were to assume that such programming could successfully embed basic proportionality 
understanding in AWS technology, we are once again faced with the same issue that can be 
seen to underlie many legal and technological hurdles facing AWS. Noel Sharkey also 
identifies this as a crucial barrier in AWS proportionality, the technology simply does not 
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possess the relevant human qualities to decide on when the damage to civilians would exceed 
the aforementioned anticipated military advantage provided by the attack.74 Considering this, 
one could say that Kastan is correct in saying that despite potential technological 
advancements the future may hold, the necessary analysis and assessment involved in the 
principle of proportionality would have to be left to humans.75 Additionally, one must also 
take into account the infinite number of scenarios that AWS might be confronted with, this 
alone makes it almost impossible to program this technology to replicate the decision process 
of a combatant.  
If there is no way in which this issue can be resolved, then it appears as though AWS violates 
IHL in such a serious way that it could be considered as a war crime under the 1998 Rome 
Statue of the International Criminal Court.76 
 
3.4 Human Rights Agreements 
With the rapid growth of AWS development over the past few years the debate surrounding 
their use has intensified, with the primary concern being the legality of them. Despite the fact 
that legality has seemingly taken centre, the implication arising from potential human rights 
violation is an issue that deserves equal attention. The lack of importance allocated to human 
rights in this conversation seems completely misguided; civilians are the unwilling victims of 
armed conflict, by deploying AWS into combat there is an automatic increase risk and 
concern regarding human rights violations.  The use of force human soldiers apply will 
eventually be applied by AWS, and with the rapid development of technology this could 
occur sooner rather than later.  One could argue that the consideration of Human Rights 
should not be considered as a separate issue and should in fact be considered alongside IHL 
due to the fact that they are complementary of each other when applied in the situation of 
armed conflict. As discussed by Christof Heyns, the question we should be concerned with is: 
‘is the use of AWS to apply force permissible under human rights law, and is so under what 
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circumstances’.77 In his report Heyns breaks this question down into 7 areas that all hold 
equal importance, however it could be argued that the main point of focus should be which 
human rights are at risk of being infringed if AWS are to dispense force either in a lethal or 
non-lethal way. The right to life and the right to human dignity present themselves as the 
most noticeable rights that are exposed to potential infringements, these two rights are widely 
recognised and are not only included in the main human rights treaty but can also be found in 
customary international law.  
If we first consider the right to life, according to article 6 (1) of the ICCPR, ‘every human 
being has the inherent right to life. This shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his life’.78 The potential violation here occurs due to the fact that one of the 
assumptions under international human rights laws is that the ‘kill decision’ must be 
reasonable and carried out by a human. The concept of ‘reasonableness’ is inherently human 
and stems from a combination of strategy and emotion that can only be displayed by a 
human. Despite machines having a certain level of self-development in the form of machine 
learning, the extent of this does not reach to emotional development, and so it is not possible 
for machines to ‘reason’ in the same way a human does, and it therefore follows that if a 
machine cannot ‘reason’ it also cannot take a ‘reasonable’ decision. Like Heyns, if we 
consider Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it provides that ‘all human 
beings are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit 
of brotherhood.’79 Whilst the terminology is somewhat archaic, the meaning remains relevant 
and maintains a strong emphasis on the human being the party that exercises reasoning and 
interaction, not AWS or any other technology that may be developed to act autonomously in 
combat. This considered, if we allow AWS to make their own decision when it comes to 
force then there will certainly be an infringement to the right to life. With the inability to feel 
emotion and make reasonable decisions, it is extremely doubtful that that AWS will be able 
to distinguish between a person surrendering and a person whom has the intention to attack. 
Without this element of distinction, we are allowing the machines programming to determine 
whether to act with lethal effect, therefore presenting a grave risk to the right to life. 
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The second human rights issue that should be considered is the potential violations to the 
right to human dignity; this right is seen to be at the heart of all human rights and should be 
consider in conjunction with other human rights, such as the right to life. Article 1 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides the following: ‘all human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and 
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’80 The concept of human dignity 
has distinct moral grounds and in saying that there has been a violation of human dignity you 
are implying that the action committed is morally problematic. When considering the 
violation of human dignity at the hands of AWS, a common theme amongst academics is that 
it is the removal of human agents from the decision to kill is the ultimate indignity; Heyns 
uses the example of the ‘Riobot’81 to demonstrate this. Whilst it is not currently autonomous 
in relation to the use of force, it is not farfetched to assume that this could become a reality. 
The idea that the miners are being herded like cattle by an autonomous robot strips the miners 
of their dignity and de-humanises them. The so called ‘death by algorithm’82 essentially 
means that AWS would be treating people as interchangeable entities and so will have total 
disregard for their dignity. In his report to the United Nations General Assembly Heyns, 
voices his concern regarding this and writes: ‘delegating this process [of deciding on targets] 
dehumanizes armed conflict even further and precludes a moment of deliberation in those 
cases where it may be feasible. Machines lack morality and mortality and should as a result 
not have life and death powers over humans’.83 One could say that ‘machines lack morality 
and mortality’ is the most significant aspect of this discussion. We are aware that AWS do 
not have the emotional capacity of a human, nor do they possess any quality that resembles 
empathy or reasonableness; this is simply something that cannot be programmed and remains 
a distinctive human feature. Because of this, AWS cannot possibly comprehend the 
implications of killing or injuring a human being. 
There are, of course, various candidates that could be affected by the use of AWS in combat, 
if we split these into two categories: active players (combatants) and passive players 
(civilians), we can begin to see whose dignity would be at stake. One could argue that the 
civilians are at greater risk of being stripped of their dignity due to them being passive 
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players in combat, they have little regard to the rule of war due to the fact that they are not 
actively engaging in the war, unlike the combatants, they are unable anticipate what could 
happen and taking refuge is often not an option. Furthermore, if we consider that both passive 
and active players in combat will be inhabiting the same geographical area, the issues of 
distinction (as discussed above) becomes an issue. Without the capacity to discriminate 
between combatants and non-combatants and to combine this distinction with the rules of 
proportionality, how are we to expect that AWS will not violate the human right to dignity by 
indiscriminately killing a civilian trying to surrender?  
The issue of AWS violating human dignity is complex, whilst there are unknown factors and 
limitations to AWS, it does not take away the fact that they are programmed to have a high 
level of accuracy and in some senses provide more benefits than human combatants. There is 
a great deal of focus on the fact that human dignity is violated because a human commander 
is able to display mercy and compassion and robots do not posses such abilities, whilst this is 
true it does not stand to mean that human commanders will show mercy and compassion. A 
question raised by Dieter Birnbacher84 is whether or not an attack by a terror bomber is less 
cruel because the commander of the aeroplane might in principle be merciful whereas an 
autonomous system would not.85 In answer to this, it could be argued that there is a higher 
level of cruelty involved if an individual possesses the ability to be merciful yet actively 
chooses not to. In the discussion regarding AWS violating human dignity, it is imperative 
that there is a realisation that the mere capability to display mercy and compassion does not 
equate to a ‘safer’ warzone and a reduced risk to violations of human rights. By dismissing 
AWS because of their lack of human emotion is in some ways idealising human warfare by 
making the assumption that humans will always exercise correct and merciful judgment in 
the heat of a battle. It could be argued that humans are capable of violating the dignity of 
other humans in more ways than AWS are; robots lack the emotional capacity of humans and 
are yet to have full autonomy and so are limited to their programming. Humans, however, are 
capable of making their own decisions, and both historic and current war crimes demonstrate 
horrific violations of dignity and other human rights violations that were inflicted by humans 
without the aid of AWS.  
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There is no doubt that AWS present us with dangers and uncertainties that should be dealt 
with and many of these include ethical considerations, however we should be cautious in 
thinking that AWS introduces a new quality of warfare.86 
 
3.5 Ethical and Moral implications 
 
The concept of ethics and morals hold great significance in the discussion regarding AWS; as 
previously discussed, the human rights implications and potential violations create a 
worrying narrative when it comes to introducing this technology into modern warfare and 
integrating it into society. Some may argue that these concepts have been pushed to one side 
in a bid to advance this technology as quickly as possible and with limited hurdles. Whilst the 
terms are often used with a great level of interchangeability, ‘ethics’ and ‘morals’ are in fact 
two distinct concepts. When we consider what is meant by morals, we are referring to notions 
that can be seen as right and wrong, such notions influence us individually in our daily life 
and should be seen as subjective;87 ethics however are norms that are shared by a group and 
are formed around mutual reciprocal recognition.88 Clearly the differences here are somewhat 
subtle yet they are important non-the-less; this chapter will focus mainly on the ethical 
implications of AWS and will consider how such ethics exist in the broader international 
community. 
The legality of implementing AWS has been at the forefront of the discussion regarding their 
development and deployment into armed conflict, however, the technological developments 
involved in this weaponry raise some serious concerns in relation to IHL, human rights and 
disarmament agreements. As with any new weapons development, each country strives to be 
in possession of the most advanced technology in order to put themselves at a strategical 
advancement. With the US government making the prediction of the automation of armed 
conflict for the year 2032,89 it would be logical to assume that the 40 countries currently 
developing AWS for their militaries will be anxious to be in possession of the most up to date 
technologies. This considered, the continued development of AWS and LAWS has the 
potential to trigger global arms race, a concern raised by several experts, including Robert 
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Sparrow.90 The Human Rights Watch made the following statement regarding this point: 
“But the temptation will grow to acquire fully autonomous weapons, also known as ‘lethal 
autonomous robotics’ or ‘killer robots’. If one nation acquires these weapons, others may 
feel they have to follow suit to avoid falling behind in a robotic arms race”,91 if one 
considers what is meant by this, we a brought back to the reason why AWS were developed 
in the first place and that is to play a valuable role in armed conflict and reduce the mortality 
rate of soldiers. Autonomous systems as a whole provide countless advantages to the human 
race, the introduction of Autonomous systems into biology, neuroscience and cybernetics 
have made the impossible a possibility and the advancements in these areas are not showing 
any signs in slowing down. However, this is not the area of robotics that has sparked calls for 
a pre-emptive ban; the robotic revolution in military weaponry is where the core fear stems 
from and the developments in this area raise numerous ethical and moral questions.  
The kind of autonomous weapons that feature in science fiction films are of course not the 
technology that we are dealing with as it is yet to be developed, however one could argue that 
the calls for a pre-emptive ban are in fact based on these sci-fi orientated depictions of AWS 
becoming a reality and the ethical minefield that will be attached to this.  
Attempts have been made to create some kind of laws or set of rules that would be able to 
govern AI in order for them to make ethical decision for their own actions. One attempt 
comes in the form of The Three Laws of Robotics put forwards by Isaac Asimov. These rules  
provide us with an elegant set of  ethical principals in relation to robotics, the three laws are 
as follows: (i) “a robot may not injure a human being, or through inaction, allow a human 
being to come to harm”, (ii) “A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings, except 
where such orders would conflict with the first law”, (iii) “a robot must protect its own 
existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the first or second law.92 Whilst 
these laws are successful in the realms of science fiction, they have very little practical 
implications for the contemporary autonomous military reality that we are being faced with, 
and academics such as Ronald Arkin generally regard the rules as an inadequate basis for 
machine ethics.93  
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Whilst Asimov’s Laws can essentially be disregarded in this discussion, the concept of 
applying some degree of ethical thinking and moral responsibility to AWS is something that 
cannot be ignored, and one would argue that the ethics surrounding AWS hold a higher level 
of importance to the actual legality of them. This seems like a somewhat drastic view to take 
however, the implementation of AWS, and indeed the rapid development of AWS 
technology, provides a legal anomaly and an accountability gap. The race to keep up with the 
development in this area has seemingly blinded the parties involved to their moral and legal 
responsibilities and whether or not this technology would be able to comply with 
international humanitarian laws, human rights law or the laws of armed conflict. Having said 
this, there has not been a complete failure in this department; The Martens Clause,94 which 
appears in the Geneva Convention, creates a legal obligation for states to consider moral 
implications when assessing new technology. Its application becomes necessary in the event 
there is no specific existing law on the topic, therefore would be applicable in relation to 
AWS and LAWS due to the limited laws in place to deal with them. In particular, this clause 
highlights the requirement for new technology to comply with the principles of humanity and 
dictates a public conscience. Many of the AWS that are in use are Human-on-the-loop 
weapons,95 yet with the technological advancements that in progress, the machines have a 
quicker reaction time than humans; this therefore removes the ability for a human operator to 
override the robots actions before impact. If we consider this fact in conjunction with the 
Martens clause, we notice that the technology indicates there is a gap in international law that 
threatens the human right to dignity and provides an ethical conundrum.  
 
Fundamental ethical implications of AWS have been highlighted by Lin in 2008, this came in 
the form of three core ethical implications:96 (i) whether LAWS would be able to follow 
established guidelines of IHL and the rules of engagement, as specified in the Geneva 
Conventions; (ii) whether they would know the difference between military and civilian 
personnel; (iii) whether they would recognize a wounded soldier and refrain from shooting97. 
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When considering these implications, it becomes apparent that these all relate back to issue of 
responsibility and accountability for AWS; all of the questions posed by Lin’s ethical 
implication can be answered if asked in relation to humans due to the fact that they are able 
to process information in both a logical and emotional way, something that AWS lacks. If we 
are to discuss these matters in the context of AWS, we start asking the following questions: if 
a robot acts for itself or in an unpredictable way that the human controllers don’t understand, 
who will be held responsible for it? This is a question that has been considered in chapter 2 in 
relation to the legality of assigning responsibility and accountability to AWS, however if we 
look at it from an ethical standpoint, we are dealing with the lives of innocent civilians whom 
the technology could not identify as such. If we take the example of an AWS in the form of a 
drone that has been programmed to protect a boarder, this drone then erroneously identifies a 
mother and child seeking asylum as a hostile threat and shoots them both dead. If this duty 
was given to a human solider then they would be able to distinguish between a threat and a 
civilian, yet at present AWS do not have this capability.  
Separate, yet not dissimilar to the ethical concerns raised by AWS technology is the morality 
of AWS, with one of the main concerns being whether or not their algorithms can be 
considered to be discriminatory enough. This takes us back to the issue regarding distinction 
discussed above and provides us with one main question that is integral to this discussion: 
should we relinquish the decision to kill a human to a non-human machine?98 This is a 
question that Aaron M. Johnson and Sidney Axinn discuss in their paper on the morality of 
autonomous robots, a question that one may argue is at the centre of all discussion be that 
legal, ethical, political or moral. The engineering involved in the development of AWS 
allows this technology to advance in a way that in theory makes them more compliable with 
IHL, calculating and performing tasks with levels of accuracy and efficiently than any human 
could possibly achieve. Yet despite this, it still fails to consider the moral judgments involved 
in these decisions; regardless of the progress made in machine development, the concept of 
integrating empathy and real human emotions such as love, guilt and mercy into a machine, is 
nothing short of science fiction. For example, if we consider a situation in armed combat 
where an enemy soldier finds themselves in the firing line of the oppositions AWS and makes 
an attempt to surrender, or pleads to be taken as a prisoner, the robot simply does not have an 
 
98 Aaron M. Johnson & Sidney Axinn (2013) ‘THE MORALITY OF AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS’, Journal of 
Military Ethics, 129-141, DOI: 10.1080/15027570.2013.818399 
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emotional capacity to make a judgment based on morals. The enemy soldier will 
consequently end up being shot and killed as this is the programming of the AWS.  
It is not unreasonable to assume that this scenario has the capability of becoming a reality, 
nor is it unreasonable to assume that at some point in the future, robotics will develop to the 
stage at which they have an artificial sense of morality and are able to make decisions based 
on basic human morals that have been embedded into their algorithms. Hellstrom takes the 
view that futuristic robots will be programmed with highly advanced cognitive abilities to 
perceive, plan and learn as well as a multitude of complex behaviour. He argues that this 
increase in autonomy could open up the possibility of Military commanders treating them as 
though they were human soldiers, directing orders at them and expecting tasks to be carried 




























The questions this dissertation was seeking to address regarded the way in which AWS sit 
within legal frameworks and ethical frameworks and if these were suitable. The work will 
look at and evaluate these findings, then postulate some future suggestions that may be 
appropriate.  
 
Chapter one provided some definitional parameters that allowed the discussion regarding 
AWS to develop, and in doing so provided us with foundations of the issues at hand. 
Autonomous weapons are not an entirely new form of technology, with basic forms such as 
antipersonnel land mines first used on a wide scale in World War II. Whilst these land mines 
work on the basis that there need not be any direct human intervention in setting it off, the 
Autonomous weapons that are being developed currently are embedded with extremely 
sophisticated software that allow for a more effective and advanced weapon. At the forefront 
of this discussion was the fact that AWS technology is being developed at an increasingly 
rapid rate with little consideration regarding the legal or ethical implications of such 
developments. Furthermore, the lexicography surrounding AWS is failing to adapt at an 
efficient rate, consequently paving the way to a dramatic definition ambiguity. An example of 
such ambiguity can be seen by the way in which ‘autonomous’ and ‘automation’ are being 
used interchangeably yet have different meanings and applications. 
Whilst the misuse of certain terminology could be seen as trivial, it actually provides us with 
a serious issue that is deeply embedded in the legislation governing the use of AWS. With 
approximately 30 countries either deploying or developing defensive systems that can be 
placed somewhere on the spectrum of ‘autonomous’, this is not simply a domestic issue, but 
an issue that has international implications. One of the most central points in relation to 
definitional parameters is the fact that at present, fully autonomous weapons are essentially a 
thing of science fiction and do not currently exist in the way people believe they do. The 
prospect of a ‘killer robot’ and the potential dangers they pose has sparked fear and unease 
into civilians and academics alike, with a widespread call for a pre-emptive ban. However, 
the research that was conducted for the purpose of this dissertation has led me to believe that 
whilst there should be caution and perhaps a certain level of apprehension regarding the 
development of AWS, a pre-emptive ban could be seen as a fear-based decision based on the 
imagery of anthropogenic robots depicted in science fiction. A global consensus on what is 
deemed to be an Autonomous Weapon would provide much needed clarity, allowing 
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legislation to be effectively implemented and thus governing the use of such weaponry. A 
further concern discovered in chapter one was regarding self-awareness of AWS and the 
subsequent diminished human control that would follow. The delegation of the human 
decision-making responsibilities to AWS is a concern that many academics share, including 
Crootof and Asaro. Whilst it may be a trivial solution, introducing clarity surrounding what is 
classified as an Autonomous weapon provides us with a potential solution to reducing the 
uncertainty surrounding the development of self-aware AWS and whether or not they would 
be able to comply with the laws of war. Fully autonomous weapons are, again, merely 
hypothetical and the confusion here is once again embedded in conflicting definitions of what 
classifies as an AWS. Without definitional clarity it seems unlikely that any form of 
responsibility or accountability could be enforced, therefore leaving the floodgates open to a 
whole host of detrimental ethical implications.  
  
The issues regarding responsibility and accountability of AWS formed one of the key 
discussions at the centre of this dissertation. The wide-spread definitional ambiguity involved 
in AWS has consequently led to holding any human agent responsible or accountable 
becoming extremely difficult. Chapter two was able to identify the possible parties that could 
be exposed to potential liability, as well as a consideration to potential criminal responsibility 
and the accountability gap that has developed. Any violations committed by AWS technology 
are likely to contain criminal elements; however, the application of criminal responsibility to 
AWS faces various difficulties due to the fact that this legislation was designed for human 
application and elements of criminal responsibility such as mens rea are not compatible with 
the capabilities of AWS. It was interesting to note however, that the general principles of 
criminal responsibility, specifically those relating to German law, and the individual criminal 
responsibility for war crimes provided an opportunity to re-design these existing laws in the 
context of AWS. This was a somewhat unexpected discovery due the fact that the majority of 
current laws have no apparent leeway to integrate provisions to deal with AWS being 
implemented and developed. I found however, that if one was to approach AWS as being 
akin to a Vordermann,99 it removes the issues of lack of capacity to act with intent. The lack 
of human qualities AWS possesses have been the route to an extensive range of problems 
 
99 In this situation the consideration of AWS being akin to a Vordermann (the direct perpetrator of the criminal 
act) is based on the concept of a person committing a crime through another being indirect perpetration. The 
Hintermann controls the Vordermann in such a way that he is manipulated and used as a tool. Analogous to the 
way in which AWS are used as tools.  
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covered within this research, but if we were to consider AWS as an innocent agent, we then 
allow ourselves the possibility of attributing the responsibility and accountability to the 
human agent.  
 
Further to the responsibility and accountability concerns addressed, I hoped to discuss the 
legal and ethical implication that AWS posed, chapter 3 provided an outlook on these issues. 
Considering the global impact that the deployment of AWS has, a discussion surrounding the 
International Humanitarian Laws and Human Rights implication provided and appropriate 
angle to fully consider the legal effects that AWS threatens. The right to human dignity 
emerged as being one of the most prevalent issues in relation to both the legal and ethical 
implications of AWS, this could be due to the fact that it is a right that each nation has in 
common and is something that humanity holds dear to them.  
 
It seems to me that the development of this technology will continue regardless of whether 
the legislation is willing to keep up with these advancements. If we are to ask whether or not 
laws regarding responsibility and accountability for the actions of AWS are sufficient or not, 
the simple answer would be no. International and domestic laws provide the potential for 
appropriate adaptation yet a large proportion of the relevant parties are pre-occupied with 
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